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Some Comments on Labor Dispute
Settlement Processes
Paul H. Sanders*
"A Strikeless Society on America's Horizon?"
The question mark at the end of this recent headline on a syndicated newspaper column suggests appropriate skepticism about the
substance therein, even though the column reported that the first
eleven months of 1973 had been "the most serene labor climate in
a decade with manhours lost at a 10-year low."' Well before the
year-end "energy crisis" and attendant economic dislocations, however, questions such as the following, far from being in the realm
of idle conjecture, were becoming increasingly pertinent: Will the
travail of this gloomy period be the fullness of time for the emergence of significant new developments in labor peacemaking? Will
pervasive fears and drives to satisfy divergent needs in difficult
times coalesce the forces moving toward more rational and less
costly methods of resolving labor conflicts? Will the necessity of
developing legal alternatives for the illegal strike in the public
sector (governmental employment) lead to improved methods of
peaceful settlement in the private sector?
A number of signs point to affirmative answers to these questions. AFL-CIO President George Meany has said that "a strike
doesn't make sense" when a well-established industry and a wellestablished union can agree to arbitrate wage adjustments in a new
agreement in the event their collective bargaining itself does not
resolve the particular dispute.2 In a more recent press release, President Meany declared: "Strikes are expensive. We'd like to see some
mechanism that would eliminate strikes because we find that
strikes are becoming more and more expensive not only to industry
but to those we represent. '3 In March 1973, companies in the basic
steel industry and the United Steelworkers of America signed a
landmark agreement under which there will be no strike and no
* Professor of Law, Vanderbilt University, A.B. 1931, Austin College; J.D, 1934, Duke
University. The author gratefully acknowledges the assistance of Mark E. Edwards, staff
member of the Law Review, for his background research in the preparation of this article.
I. Fritchey, A Strikeless Society on America's Horizon?, Nashville Tennessean, Nov.
29. 1973. at 15, col. 1.
2. BNA (1970) Lab. Rel. Yearbook 276.
3. Kagel & Kagel, Using Two New Arbitration Techniques, 14 COL. BAR.. NEC.. &
('oNTrIA(rs 351 (1972) (Strike Alternative: Med-Arb).
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lockout in disputes over any national (that is, industry-wide) issues
in the upcoming contract negotiations. Any national issues, including wages and fringe benefits, that are unresolved on April 15, 1974,
will be submitted to a five-member arbitration panel, three of whom
will be neutral. The panel will have the authority to decide all issues
referred to it by the parties, as well as questions concerning implementation of panel decisions that the parties cannot resolve.4 Apparently, the parties have thus guaranteed to resolve their 1974
bargaining issues without any industry-wide work stoppage.In the August 1973 issue of The American Federationist,a leading article entitled "Collective Bargaining and Industrial Peace"
includes the following:
[Als the collective relationship matures, the process of collective bargaining will become increasingly one of reasoning and persuasion, and less of
economic force. The parties have a distinct interest in resolving their disputes,
of course, but they also have an interest in doing so with as little pain or cost
as possible and in a manner which will not impair their ability to work together
in an amicable atmostphere.
Consistent with this thought is the proposition that if the parties are
unable in negotiations to reconcile their differences, it is still part of the design
of collective bargaining to devise or employ procedures by which these differences may be resolved without relying solely on the strike or other punitive
measures ...
It has been proclaimed that without the strike it is not possible to have
collective bargaining. This is like saying that in international affairs, if we
renounce war we cannot have diplomacy. The precise opposite seems true. In
such situations we need more effective bargaining, just as we need more effective diplomacy.'

It is not surprising that David L. Cole, Chairman of the National
Commission on Industrial Peace and one of the best known arbitrators in the nation, should make such a statement. What is more
significant is its appearance in the AFL-CIO Official Monthly Magazine, which lists George Meany as "Editor." While favoring the
promotion of voluntary alternatives to strike in the private sector,
Mr. Cole makes it clear that "this does not mean that the strike is
to be outlawed or permanently discarded. It must be kept available
for possible use . . .if either side should take an unusually extreme
and obstinate position . . . " Emphasizing his opposition to any
form of legislative compulsion, he reasons that strikes cannot be
eliminated by the "simple process of outlawing them" and argues
4. Steelworkers-Industry Experimental Agreement, 82 LAB. RpE.. R.P. 266-67 (1973).
5. Wall Street J., Oct. 17, 1973, at 21 (advertisement) ("At the invitation of United
States Steel ... I.W. Abel tells how America can become more productive").
6. Cole, Collective Bargainingand IndustrialPeace,THE AM. FEDERATIONisT. Aug. 1973,
at 23.
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that you cannot "compel people to work in harmony unless they
7
have the urge to do so."
It may be worth noting that the foregoing indications of a substantial departure from "trial by battle" in private sector
"contract-negotiation" disputes do not make express reference to
new discoveries in the behavioral sciences or the science of management2 Moreover, there are no references to legislative or administrative action. There are, in fact, no open signs of governmental
compulsion, "jawboning," or "arm-twisting." The development
does not seem to depend upon either a sudden proliferation of superneutrals' or the skill and personality of some individual, gifted
peacemaker. The processes carry the familiar titles of "collective
bargaining" and "arbitration." All that is really new is the indication of a commitment to a more vigorous, imaginative, and forehanded use of collective bargaining directed to settlement processes
as well as to substance, and a willingness to trust the arbitration
process for the solution of a contract term or "interest" dispute in
the private sector.
The intensification of governmental mediation effort and study
with greater emphasis on "preventive mediation" undoubtedly has
also been a part of the recent scene. As early as 1926, however, the
Railway Labor Act'" envisaged that all of these ingredientsvigorous bargaining, mediation, and voluntary arbitrationwould be operative in contract-term dispute settlement." To the
uninitiated, at least, acceptance of arbitration and rejection of the
strike weapon as the means of resolving a contract dispute might
7. Id. at 24.
8. The extensive literature setting forth new insights in industrial psychology and managerial science undoubtedly contributed to the creation of the climate in which these new
developments in labor dispute settlement are occurring. Discussions of human nature and
theories of management (X and Y) in D. McGREGOR, THE HUMAN SIDE OF ENTERPRISE (1960);
the "need hierarchy" advanced in A. MASLOW, MOTIVATION AND PERSONALITY (1954); and
employee motivation in F. HERZBERc, B. MAUSHER & B. SNYDERMAN, THE MOTIVATION TO
WORK (2d ed. 1959) should prove most stimulating to any person involved in labor conflict
resolution. See also Herzberg, One More Time: How Do You Motivate Employees?, in How
SITCESSFUI. EXEC(UTIVEs HANDLE PEOPLE-TWELVE STUDIES ON COMMUNICATIONS AND MANACE-

NIENT SKIlLS 82 (1970) (Harvard

College publication).

9. See Conflict Resolution and the Superneutral,61 Gov. EMP. REL. REP. 521-23 (1973).
10. Railway Labor Act §§ 1-201, 45 U.S.C. §§ 151-88 (1970).
11. As stated in § 1(a), the main purpose of the Railway Labor Act is to avoid any
interruption to commerce or the operation of any carrier. 45 U.S.C. § 15(a) (1970). To accomplish this, the Act establishes a series of steps that the parties to a labor dispute must follow
to settle their differences. Beginning with collective bargaining, id. § 152, the steps progress
through mediation under the National Mediation Board, id. §§ 152 Ninth, 155; voluntary
arbitration, id § 155; and possible Presidential intervention, id. § 160.
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seem to deserve little comment, since no-strike clauses and grievance arbitration, which involve "rights" under collective agreements, usually are provided in such agreements. 2 The manner in
which the Steel Industry Pact is being publicized and scrutinized :,
demonstrates, however, that this surface impression is inappropriate.
The concern reflected in some of the quoted materials for voluntary, mutually acceptable action in the use of the arbitration process is not universal by any means. In fact, there is considerable
support where government employees are concerned ("public sector") for imposing a final settlement by means of the arbitration
process, whether or not consented to by the parties, if other settlement procedures fail to resolve the dispute. 4 Some state statutes so15
provide and the trend in this direction is not likely to be reversed.
Within the portion of the private sector covered by the National
Labor Relations Act, " there does not appear to be any substantial
sentiment on the part of either labor or management for any such
"compulsory" or "legislated" arbitration.'7 On the other hand, railroad and airline management, who are covered by the Railway
Labor Act,1" have urged legislative imposition of final and binding
decisions in disputes regarding contract terms.
In the push to establish peaceful methods of settling contract
negotiation disputes, particularly in the promotion of arbitration,
some statements appear to suggest that all "labor conflict" should
be deplored and that the adversary atmosphere can and should be
banished from labor-management relations. For example, a recent
full-page advertisement of the United States Steel Corporation20
NFc,. & CONTRACTS 261 (1972); Basic
12. See Grievancesand Arbitration,51 COL. BARCG.
Patterns in Union Contracts, 77 COL. BARe. NEC.. & CONTRACTS 1 (1971).
13. See, e.g., Notes 4 & 5 supra and note 20 infra.
14. A comprehensive discussion will be found in Howlett, ContractNegotiationArbitration in the Public Sector, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 47 (1973).
15. Id. at 65-69.
16. National Labor Relations Act § 2(2), 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970). This section of the
Act limits application to the private sector by excluding from the definition of employer "the
United States or any wholly owned Government corporation, .... or any State or political
subdivision thereof .... "
17. "On the whole, however, labor and management are clearly against such measures."
DuNIOP. LABOR AND THE AMERICAN COMMUNITY 236 (1970).
1).
130K & .J.
18. Railroad management is covered by Title I of the Act, Railway Labor Act §§ 1-11,
45 U.S.C. §§ 151-61 (1970), while airline management is covered by Title II, Railway Labor
Act §§ 201-07, 45 U.S.C. §§ 181-87 (1970).
19. Note 17 supra. See also Final Report of the Ad Hoc Comm. to Study National
Emergency Disputes. ABA SETIMON OF LABOR RELATIONS LAW (1966).
20. Wall Street J., Jan. 3, 1974, at 9 (advertisement).
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proposes that a "Declaration of Interdependence" be signed in
connection with the dedication of an "American Productivity Center." "By this act," it is declared, "we will recognize that labor and
business can no longer continue their adversary relationship, that
all of us are inseparably linked in the productivity quest. ' 2, In addition, an advertisement for a current arbitration seminar asserts:
Labor conflict hurts. Management knows it. The unions know it . . . [and]
so does the consumer. And today fewer people on either side of the fence are
willing to live with it.u

It is not helpful thus to reject broadly the concept of an "adversiry
relationship." While the purpose undoubtedly was constructive, the
suggestion that "labor conflict" necessarily is detrimental and that
"living without it" is both desirable and readily achievable, is neither realistic nor fundamentally constructive.
The context of the seminar advertisement quoted above shows
that what is being described as hurtful is not disagreement between
the employer and organized employees, but rather the conflictresolution process used to bring the disagreement to an end. The
strike and arbitration are alternative settlement mechanisms. Although it might be thought that an agreement to submit an unresolved dispute for binding decision by a third party terminates the
"labor conflict" on the particular matter, it is more instructive and,
hopefully, constructive to view the conflict as a continuing one,
pending an accepted conclusion of the dispute. "Conflict" is no
more a "dirty word" than "change," and change inevitably involves
conflict. While it may paralyze and destroy, conflict may also provide the occasion for achieving new forms of excellence for all concerned. Some conflict will be recognized as positively desirable, and,
conversely, the absence of it will indicate an unhealthy or moribund
state. The adversary process is an essential ingredient in an arbitration proceeding just as it is in a court of law.
Conflict over compensation and conditions of employment is,
in fact, inevitable in the employment relationship, whether or not
the employees are unionized. Necessarily then, effective procedures
for resolving such conflict will be an essential condition for viable
operation of the enterprise, whether or not the employees have a
collective-bargaining representative. The promise to marshal collective strength and to supply more effective representation in such
21.

Id.

22. Advertisement of American Management Associations, A Seminar: Arbitration:
Preparingand Presenting Your Arbitration Case.
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conflict resolution is the basic "stock in trade" of labor organization
drives. If a union is chosen, it becomes legally obligated to provide
24
fair representation 3 and to deal with the employer at arm's length.
To choose collective bargaining, therefore, is to opt for the adversary
process on behalf of all in the unit with regard to compensation and
working conditions. 25 Physical violence, economic punishment, and
vituperative language have no inherent or necessary relationship to
this process. The adversary feature can, and should, add thoroughness and fairness to the operation of the conflict-resolving process
and, by contributing to its effectiveness, serve public as well as
private purposes. Desirable as it is to recognize mutuality of interest
and to promote labor-management harmony and cooperation in certain areas, nothing will be gained by glossing over the existence of
an intrinsic "labor conflict" and the positive need for the continuation of a vigorous adversary approach to acceptable resolutions of
such conflict.
At one time I too assumed that an analysis which placed emphasis on "conflict" and "adversaries" was not the most fruitful
approach in a discussion stressing labor dispute settlement. Writing
in 1947, prior to the enactment of the Labor-Management Relations
Act 2 in that year, I said:
[Ilt would be possible to analyze the measures taken by the parties to labor
disputes in terms of economic strategy, physical tactics, psychological warfare,
and political maneuvering. It is possible, in fact, to view the whole body of
labor law in terms of the judicial and legislative process which from time to
time alters the relative strength of the parties, now giving a potent legal
weapon to one side or the other, and again rendering legally ineffective a device
used by one of them. Analyses along such lines, although they have some
utility and are appealing because of the dynamic character of the subjectmatter, overemphasize the 'struggle' aspect of labor relations and distort out
of all recognition the economic function performed by the enterprise in which
the employment is carried on and the relationship that must exist between
employer and employee in carrying out that enterprise with the maximum of
benefit to the parties and the general public. If one of two parties, engaged in
an enterprise in which there is mutuality of interest, wins a 'battle' over the
other, the probability of success of the enterprise will be lessened in proportion
to the damage inflicted.27
23. See, e.g., Syres v. Oil Workers Union Local 23, 350 U.S. 892 (1955) (per curiam)
(National Labor Relations Act); Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R., 323 U.S. 192 (1944) (Railway
Labor Act). See generally THE DEVFLOPINcG LABOR LAW 26-56 (C. Morris ed. 19711.
24. See, e.g., Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act)

§ 2, 29 U.S.C. § 402 (1970); Morris, supra note 23, at 726-56.
25. See National Labor Relations Act § 9(a), 29 U.S.C. § 159(a) (1970) (representative
chosen by majority is exclusive representative of all employees in a unit); note 24 supra.

26.

Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §§ 201-503, 29 U.S.C.

§§ 141-97 (1970).
27. Sanders, Types of Labor Disputes and Approaches to Their Settlement, 12 LAw &
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It was a mistake to conclude that the mutuality of interest
between the employer and his employees would justify dismissing
or downgrading the conflict, or "struggle," aspect of the relationship. The truth is that these two aspects-conflict and mutuality of
interest-must continue to coexist in an appropriate balance. My
statement about the development of labor law accurately stressed
the "conflict" context and relationship. As subsequent legislative 5
and administrative"9 action have demonstrated, this concept in fact
provides the essential basis for any general theory of labor relations
law in this country.
In the area of labor dispute settlement, an understanding of the
nature of labor conflict and the patterns of conflict development and
escalation should be useful in understanding and utilizing the processes that lead to final settlement. All of these processes amount
to successive steps in, or continuations of, conflict resolution efforts.
As has been well said: "If you desire peace, understand war."30 The
statement, however, is devoid of moral content. It offers no suggestion of limits on strategy and tactics nor any indication about the
substantive basis of the "peace," apart from the fact that it embodies a resolution of the conflict accepted by the involved parties. In
our federal labor law, such matters may be discussed in connection
with the implications of the mutual obligation to engage in goodfaith bargaining' and the employer's obligation not to discriminate:" against employees who engage in "protected concerted activities. ' '133 Strangely enough, the actual resolution of labor conflict-the achievement of labor peace-does not seem to be of major
consequence in the midst of what may well be an over extensive
('ONTEMI'.

PHOR.211, 212 (1947).

28. E.g., Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) §§ 201-503, 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-97 (1970); Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act (Landrum-Griffin Act)
§§ 1-611, 29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970).
29. The responses of the National Labor Relations Board to subsequent wants are many
and varied. Examples of developments include treatment of employer "no-solicitation" rules
and lockouts. See generally Morris, supra note 23 at 84-5, 539-56.
30. Motto of the Institut Francais de Polmologie.
31. National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(5), (b)(3) & (d), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(5),
(b)(3) & (d) (1970).
32. National Labor Relations Act §§ 8(a)(1) & (3), 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1) & (3) (1970).
33. National Labor Relations Act § 7,29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970), provides: "Employees
shall have the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor organizations, to bargain
collectively through representatives of their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted
activities for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection, and shall
also have the right to refrain from any or all such activities except to the extent that such
right may be affected by an agreement requiring membership in a labor organization as a
condition of employment as authorized in section 158(a)(3) of this title."
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regulation of the bargaining process.
The term "labor conflict" should refer to a condition of opposition in desire related to assumed needs in the area of compensation
and working conditions. It cannot be restricted to situations where
one or more parties in their efforts to resolve the conflict are acting
illegally or are legally utilizing a strike or lockout as a privileged
economic weapon to pressure a desired settlement. Conflict resolution behavior should be viewed as including not only the orderly, the
peaceful, and the rational, but also the disorderly, the violent, and
the irrational. As the quotation beginning "Labor conflict hurts '' "
indicates, the persistent problem is to find methods of conflict resolution that will minimize the hurt to both the parties in conflict and
consumers, and that all concerned can "live with." Apart from commanding good-faith bargaining between employers and the representatives of employees, the National Labor Relations Act, our most
important federal law, provides little substance in solving this
central problem. It is true that the Railway Labor Act, promising
perhaps more than it has achieved, goes into detail about dispute
settlement procedures? 5 Moreover, "precatory words" on settlement
are expressed in section 201 of the Labor-Management Relations
Act. " On the whole, however, our federal labor statutes, regulations,
and the reports of their implementation reflect the ambivalence
between "war" and "peace," with the attention usually centered on
the former.
One explanation for the lack of emphasis on labor conflict resolution is that "peace at any price" assuredly is not our national
policy in the labor relations field. Our laws create conflict. The
promulgation and protection of "employee rights," such as those set
forth in section 7 of the National Labor Relations Act,3 7 will provide
the support that results in the surfacing of conflict that otherwise
would have been unobserved and, perhaps, non-existent. More importantly, the major thrust of our laws has been to restrain and
"defuse" the excesses of labor conflict-diverting it from physical
34. See note 22 supra.
35. See note 11 supra.
36. Section 201(b) provides that "the settlement of issues between employers and employees through collective bargaining may be advanced by making available full and adequate governmental facilities for conciliation, mediation and voluntary arbitration to aid and
encourage employers and the representatives of their employees to. . .make all reasonable
efforts to settle their differences by mutual agreement reached through conferences and
collective bargaining or by such methods as may be provided for in any applicable agreement
for the settlement of disputes." 29 U.S.C. § 171(b) (1970).
37. 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
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violence and economic coercion into the very serious "war game" we
call collective bargaining, while retaining limited privileges to pressure agreement with economic weapons. To many, the only purpose
of playing a game is "winning," which means overcoming your adversary. Having ritualized and, hopefully, civilized labor conflict,
most of our labor law is concerned with "rules of the game." We thus
combine the adversary process of the law and an adversary system
in economics-an arrangement in which ethical and moral problems
will proliferate.
While our laws contemplate the settlement of disputes by the
collective-bargaining process and achieve considerable success in
this respect, there is nothing that positively commands settlement,
much less a "just," mutually-acceptable, conclusion. At the federal
level, we have vast amounts of material informing us of the legal
requirement to bargain in good faith-the minimum limits of the
obligation.3 There is very little in our laws beyond exhortation"5 to
provide guidance or incentive with respect to the means of achieving
the affirmative purpose of collective bargaining-to make and
maintain agreements concerning wages, hours, and conditions of
employment, as well as to resolve disputes over the application of
such agreements. We should be able to provide a more substantial
legal structure to teach and support the basic lesson of successful
bargaining, which is to provide pay-offs to protect the reasonable
interests of conflicting parties and all concerned-"let everybody
win." It is perhaps too much to hope that we could dismantle some
of our laws and administrative machinery that impede "free collective bargaining." We need fewer law enforcers and more broadgauged, skillful mediators (superneutrals, if you prefer) with a dominant commitment to the achievement of viable resolutions of labor
conflict in the national interest. Considering the occasions for our
major strikes and the economic waste and other costs of work stoppage, it makes little sense at this stage of our national development
to allocate our attention and our federal resources, administrative
activity, and personnel in the way that we do between the "war"
and "peace" sides of the ledger. We appear to be at a juncture where
intensive, knowledgeable, and imaginative bargaining, coupled with
massive mediation efforts along the lines suggested by David Cole,
:1,. See. e.g..Labor-Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act) § 204(a)(1), 29
U.S.C. § 174(a)ll) (1970); Railway Labor Act § 2 First, 45 U.S.C. § 152 First (1970).
:,1 For example, § 2 First of the Railway Labor Act simply states that "lilt shall be
the duty of all [involved in a labor dispute] to exert every reasonable effort to make and
maintain agreements ... " 45 U.S.C. § 152 First (1970). But see Chicago & N.W.R. Co. v.
United Transp. Union, 402 U.S. 570 (1971).
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could well achieve a break-through in the peaceful solution of contract disputes and the establishment of constructive patterns and
standards of wide significance. We can hope that the opportunity
will not be lost.
Notwithstanding the role played, responsibility involved, or the
substantive result desired, understanding and skill in the resolution
of labor conflict is furthered by precision and thoroughness in identifying and analyzing the basic substantive conflict (opposition in
desire related to assumed need in the area of compensation or working conditions) and behavior (including all steps or processes of
escalation or de-escalation) that lead or could lead to an accepted
conclusion. In such identification and analysis, it will be of major
importance to recognize and separate clearly the substantive aspects of the conflict from the organizational power struggle and
personality aspects (the people, individually and in organized
groups). Labor conflict will involve not only subject matter such as
wages or compulsory overtime, but also power over subject matter
within and between groups and the personalities of the various
"players." The locations and organizations of power, as well as the
personalities, will vary tremendously from one employment relation
to another. Supports and restraints in the legal structure have no
necessary carryover from one conflict to another. Very seriously, the
subject matter may be the least important aspect of a particular
conflict. The personality and power struggle aspects of labor conflict
undoubtedly explain the general reluctance of the parties to use
voluntary arbitration to settle "interest" or contract-term disputes,
as well as the continuing opposition to legislatively imposed arbitration.
As if the problem were largely an intellectual one, discussions
of labor dispute settlement have all too frequently ignored the escalation processes of conflict resolution and, assuming the existence
of a matured dispute (perhaps with a peaceful, or even violent, work
stoppage in progress), have centered on "approaches" to a peaceful
resolution of the substantive conflict.4 0 In my 1947 article, I listed
and briefly defined "all of the usual approaches" in the following
order:
(1)
(2)
(3)

Discussion and negotiation
Conciliation
Mediation

40. See, e.g., Blumrosen, Civil Rights Conflicts: The Uneasy Search for Peace in Our
Time, 27 ARm. J. (n.s.) 35 (1972); HOWLFr. supra note 14; Sanders, supra note 27.
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(4)
(5)
(6)
(7)
(8)

Voluntary arbitration
Investigation and fact-finding
Compulsory arbitration
Court action
Legislation4

The order progressed from voluntary bilateral action between the
disputing parties and the increasingly forceful involvement of a
third party to compulsion from an apparently independent outside
force. The third party involvement in turn moves from that of unilateral advice and assistance to that of dictating a decision which
the disputing parties are obliged to accept. I did not suggest that
the several processes had to occur in any particular sequence or that
they represented completely distinct and compartmentalized processes incapable of being usefully combined in a flexible manner.
"Investigation and fact-finding" was described as representing "an
extreme degree of third party interference in the dispute between
the parties, although it stopped short of forcing acceptance of the
findings upon the parties to the dispute. 4 2 Although the description
was accurate in the context in which it was made, it is now clearer
that "fact-finding," whether imposed by statute or voluntarily
sought, can and should provide increased awareness of interests and
pertinent facts, and thus assist conflicting parties directly in resolving their dispute as well as indirectly through pressures generated
by public disclosure. The "interference" designation still may be
regarded as completely appropriate where voluntary aspects are
eliminated.
The discussion of "legislation" as an approach included the
following:
Legislation is listed as an approach to the settlement of labor disputes
because through legislation certain disputes may be entirely eliminated or
procedures may be provided for their settlement. Legislation providing settlement procedures, however, results only in requiring or extending one or more
of the approaches previously discussed....
[I]t is possible by legislation to deal with the substance of the employeremployee relationship and, by defining the rights and duties of the parties, to
remove certain elements of that relationship from the field of economic contention ....

Agreement between the parties cannot validly effect any arrange-

ment which would be less beneficial to the employees. Thus through legislation
it is possible to take certain matters out of the hands of the parties entirely,
or to circumscribe the area within which they can bargain . .
41.
42.
43.

Sanders, supra note 27, at 214.
Id. at 216.
Id. at 218-19.

.
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Legislation, including administrative regulations, could provide
standards, restraints, supports, and incentives directed to advancing voluntary settlement, particularly by minimizing fears in
connection with agreements to submit disputed contract terms to
arbitration. Legislation along such lines also would be important to
any compulsory imposition of arbitration as an ultimate solution for
contract-term disputes in the public sector.44 Legislation does not
resolve conflict, however, unless the bargaining parties recognize
and accept it as producing a viable result.
It is difficult for a "peacemaker" to face up to the fact that
escalation aspects, including developmental, organizational, and
confrontational, are integral parts of the conflict resolution process.
Somewhat comparably, the adversaries involved find it difficult to
see desirable "peace" as anything other than vanquishment of, or
"unconditional surrender" by, the other side. Analytically and
practically, it would have been appropriate to place "self help" or
"unilateral action" at the beginning of my list of approaches to
labor dispute settlement. Labor conflict begins with a condition of
disaffection or opposition in desire with regard to one or more of the
"arrangements" covering compensation and conditions of employment. Some self-help efforts to resolve the conflict in a manner
acceptable to the disaffected party undoubtedly will precede any
other "approach." Measures falling under the "self-help" label may
be taken contemporaneously with, or subsequent to, one or more of
the other listed approaches, within whatever limits of legality and
morality that a conflicting party will recognize. If there is a bargaining obligation, it continues during the self-help period of a strike
and mediation efforts often will be in the picture during the same
period.
Prior to the initiation of observable self-help measures, a disaffected party will need to make a preliminary decision either to accept the status quo or to move toward a more satisfactory arrangement applicable to the subject matter of the conflict. Whether to
move for a change and, if so, the choice of supporting strategy and
tactics are subjects that lend themselves to a variety of information
gathering, intelligence efforts, and sophisticated analyses. A systematic approach to such questions would result in the development
of adequate information, the refinement of potential issues, and
would involve utilization of existing tools, methods, and insights to
aid in interest identification and evaluation, policy analysis, and
44.

Howlett, supra note 14, at 67-69.
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decision making. In the labor field, the analysis of the interests in
conflict necessarily would include and differentiate the substantive,
the power struggle, and the personality aspects involved. The following check list suggests the type of analysis that might precede a
decision concerning the use of self help in labor conflicts:
A. Strategies and tactics for behavior modification (of self or
others) on an unstructured basis.
B. Analytical preliminaries' (identification, definition, measurement, and evaluation)
(1) Of interests and parties ("self" and "other");
(2) Of authoritative restraints and "public" reactions
(including law);
(3) Of resources and allies;
(4) Of desired objective and probability of success;
(5) Of alternative routes to accomplish objective.
C. Organizational preliminaries.
D. Planning preliminaries.
E. Logistics, strategy, and tactics in operations (including
propaganda).
F. Confrontation and the initiation of dialogue.
While the foregoing check list is. not meant to suggest that
conflicting parties in the labor field routinely approach the matter
of self help in such a thorough and completely systematic a manner,
many are doing so. Rather, the point is that an extremely important
decision has to be made by a disaffected party at the outset of the
conflict resolution process and that decision making on this subject
lends itself to thoroughness in information development and analysis, systematic exploration of alternatives, the use of increasingly
sophisticated tools and methodologies, and insights and skills from
diverse disciplines and professions.
It may be helpful at this point to comment upon the cause of
conflict and some human characteristics relating to its development
and resolution. Human beings, individually and in organizations,
will act to satisfy perceived needs. It appears that all of us consciously and unconsciously make arrangements (establish relationships and create or adapt systems and institutions) to fulfill and
protect that with which we identify. Although such behavior in a
particular need area may include rigorous analysis and careful planning, rationality may be completely non-observable. In any event,
we can expect a strong sense of interest in, and an emotional attachment to, the need-satisfying "arrangements" established or felt to
be required. Since it is characteristically "human" to have exagger-
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ated conceptions of self interest, it is not surprising that overlyprotective "arrangements" frequently will be considered necessary
or at least desirable, even though their original purpose may have
diminished in importance or ceased to exist. We want "buffer
zones" to protect us against our fears, and maintaining that "buffer
zone" tends to become an independent value. We want broad areas
of freedom from restriction in which to achieve fulfillment, or what
we at one time thought was needed for fulfillment. "Arrangements"
so motivated inevitably will overlap, and be contradictory to, the
comparable desires of others. When conflict is defined as opposition
in desire with respect to these "arrangements" to meet felt needs,
its inevitabliity and pervasiveness in the labor relations field is obvious.
The self-help check list set forth above has no necessary legal
or moral content nor does the indicated analysis in any way suggest
the decision that will be reached by a particular party involved in
labor conflict. The outlined approach is as consistent with the most
exaggerated protection of self interest as it would be with a maximization of the interests of an adverse party or some other interest
represented by neither of the conflicting parties. The outline does
suggest, however, that the identification, definition, delimitation,
measurement, and evaluation of all interests significantly related to
the conflict is an aid to rational decision making by the representative of any such interest. What will be done with relatively complete
knowledge and thorough analysis involves a decision in which ethical and moral considerations will be equally as important as judgments concerning ultimate need satisfaction and practicability.
There is no indication that in the last analysis such judgments can
be made by a machine, although they may be aided significantly by
electronic data processing.
Self-help measures in labor conflict may range from the use of
raw power pushed to the uttermost to unilateral development and
insistence upon a carefully-balanced proposal believed by a partisan
to meet adequately the needs of the proponent as well as those of
the adversary and other interested parties. Basic approaches to self
help are literally "poles apart." At one pole we have what might be
called Game Plan Alpha, which is organized and managed on the
basis that the self interests of the particular party should be served
with minimum or no regard for the interests of the adversary or
others not- represented in the particular conflict; that "enemies"
should be rendered powerless or destroyed; and that the adversary
and those felt to be allied with him should be punished as need be
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to secure the objective desired by the acting party. 5 At the other
pole, what might be designated Game Plan Omega, is organized and
conducted on the basis that the interests of the acting party should
be duly recognized and protected in order to meet his reasonable
needs; that this should coexist, however, with a balanced protection
of the reasonable interests and needs of the adversary and others
concerned; that, in fact, recognition and protection of the legitimate
interests concerned to the maximum extent consistent with reasonable recognition and protection of self interest of the acting party will
prove most beneficial to him. Thus Game Plan Omega neither rejects the vigorous adversary protection of partisan interests nor calls
for the abdication of self interest. Recognizing a larger mutuality of
interest, it places upon each party in the conflict situation a duty
to minimize harm to himself and others in this larger community
and to search for that accommodation of legitimate interests,
whether or not represented, that would not only reduce costs associated with narrow concepts of self protection, but also maximize
the production of greater value for all concerned. 6
There is much wandering between the above poles in the labor
field and a particular party, normally committed to Omega, may
switch to Alpha because of the nature of the interest involved and
the perception of a fundamental threat to that interest. On the
larger conflict scene, what might be characterized as a debate between adherents to Alpha and adherents to Omega has been going
on for centuries among philosophers, theologians, historians, military strategists, political scientists, economists, behaviorists, and
others. 7 We may have reached the point, however, where there is
no longer an option, assuming one has existed. It seems increasingly
evident that Alpha must lead to zero and that, as Toynbee would
say,'5 survival depends upon the sort of a response that would be
clustered around the Omega pole.
45. For the systematic development of what is here denominated "Game Plan Alpha"
see the references to "agonology," "science of struggle," and the works of Kotarbinski in
Fisher. ('ontrasting Approaches to Conflict, in CONFLICT: VIOLENCE AND NONVIOLENCE 183 (J.
Bondurant ed. 1971).
46. M. K. Gandhi's thorough analysis and development of what he called "satyagraha"
is briefly described in Margaret Fisher's article, supra note 45, at 186-91, which illustrates
its identity with what is here dubbed "Game Plan Omega." For a comparison of"agonology"
and "satyagraha" in parallel columns see Fisher, supra note 45, at 190.
47. See generally Fisher, supra note 45.
48. A recurring theme running through the works of Arnold Toynbee is that the decline
of a civilization results from the inability of its leaders to respond creatively to new challenges, See generally A. TOYNBEE, STUDY OF HISTORY (1934-54).
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The suggested ingredients of information and analysis needed
for rational decision-making and action of a self-help nature can be
carried over with relatively minor adjustments as a particular labor
conflict moves into the negotiation (bilateral) stage. In fact, essentially the same systematic approach to the development of pertinent
facts and evaluation of interests will be of obvious value in settlement efforts as third parties become involved as mediators, factfinders, arbitrators, or some combination of such roles."' Alterations
may occur not only in the substance of a dispute, but also in its
power organization and personality aspects as "players" change and
third parties become involved in various capacities. Nevertheless,
a continuing focus on the interests to be served and the needs to be
satisfied, and a continuing refinement and critical examination of
such matters as interest identification, delimitation, measurement,
and evaluation, should provide the raw material for fruitful dialogue. By uncovering and pointing up realistic limits on interests
and needs, these methods set the stage for that creative conflict
which can be directed toward an optimum accommodation of not
only the legitimate interests of the parties, but also those interests
("public" or otherwise) not represented at the bargaining table.
In discussing labor dispute settlement involving contract terms,
there is no point in taking the spotlight away from the joint and
several responsibility of the parties at the bargaining table to "exert
every reasonable effort to make and maintain agreements"' consistent with their community of interest, their separate interests, and
those other "public" interests entitled to consideration. Neither the
parties nor the public should be given the impression that principal
reliance can be placed on third parties or "government" itself for
viable resolution of labor conflict once the identity of the bargaining
parties is established. As already indicated, legislation might be of
benefit in pressuring bargaining parties into "trying harder" to
carry out their responsibilities, such as by agreeing voluntarily to
submit contract-term disputes to arbitration if they are otherwise
unable to achieve a viable settlement. The notion, however, that
"passing a law" or the adoption of a novel gimmick somehow will
provide a magic or suitable alternative to responsible bargaining is
fallacious. Assisted by counsel, the bargaining parties know or can
discover more about their problems and the possibilities for accommodation of competing interests within their operation than any
49.
50.

See Kagel & Kagel, supra note 3.
See note 39 supra.
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outsider. They should not be "let off the hook" or given the impression that either party can do better elsewhere than he can at the
bargaining table with imagination, effort, and perseverance. Mediators can add a useful dimension to communication by assisting the
parties in uncovering and organizing pertinent facts or by providing
useful data and different approaches to known facts. Moreover, they
can help "fractionate" overly broad issues into more manageable
portions and do much to smooth the personality and power struggle
aspects of the dispute. The broad-gauged mediator with a dominant
commitment to achieving a "liveable" resolution of labor conflict in
fact can in numerous ways be of tremendous assistance to the parties in carrying out their responsibilities.5' Whether he does it by
pushing, pulling, leading, or discreetly threatening will no doubt
depend on the exigencies of the particular situation. The "conciliator with a club," acting to enforce a law narrow in scope, is, and will
likely continue to be, important in the current scene; but the basic
job of accommodating all legitimate interests in a liveable labor
settlement is not likely to be aided by such a person and the use of
the word "neutral" in his case is not very accurate.5 2 In fact, the
basic job is made more difficult as we pass another special law and
send out government servants who see their program as the center
of the labor relations universe and act accordingly. There is a problem of balance and accommodation between our several statutes in
determining what the law is to begin with. This, of course, complicates the responsibilities of bargaining representatives in achieving
balance and accommodation within the operation of an enterprise.
The responsible bargaining representatives are in the best, and
perhaps the only, position to achieve optimum accommodation and
balance of the several competing interests and "superneutrals" are
needed to assist in the exercise of this responsibility and opportunity. Nevertheless, "super self-helpers" and "super negotiators"
along with their "super counsellors" are of even more importance
and the neutral achieves excellence as he helps these others fulfill
their function in a truly creative fashion.
The position of the arbitrator is not as different from the me51. For extremely helpful insights on mediation and its relationship to the public interest see Nicolau & Cormick, Community Disputes and the Resolution of Conflict: Another
View. 27 AHt. J. (n.s.) 98 (1972), and Conflict Resolution and the S'uperneutral,note 9 supra.
Sce generally W. MAGC.iOLO. TECHNIQUFS OF MEDIATION INLABOR-DIsPt-ES (1971); W. SIMKIN.
MEIAIIiON ANt,) rie I)YNAMICS OF COLLECTIVE BARGAINING (1971).

•52. Compare Nicolau & Cormick, note 51 supra, with Blumrosen, Civil Rights Conflicts: The Uneasy Search for Peace in Our Time, 27 APm. J. (n.s.) 35 (1972).
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diator as it might seem. The same development of needs, interest
identification and evaluation, refinement of precise issues, and
organization of pertinent facts doubtless will be very much involved
in the arbitration of a contract-terms dispute. The arbitrator must,
as best he can, achieve for the parties what, perhaps, they should
have achieved for themselves or at least achieved with the assistance of a skillful, knowledgeable, broad-gauged mediator. As
David Cole has expressed it, the desirable and realistic criterion in
interest arbitration is: "What would it have been reasonable for the
parties to have agreed upon under the prevailing facts and conditions? ' ' 53 If the arbitrator does not produce a viable resolution of the
conflict with his award-one that the parties will accept and "live
with"-then the conflict remains and the processes of resolution
must continue.
53.

Cole, supra note 6, at 24.

